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 chapter 4
 FEMINIST APPROACHES 
TO CRIMINAL LAW
prabha kotiswaran
i. The Feminist Project  
in Criminal Law
The criminal law has a special place in the history of feminist struggles for law 
reform. Indeed, in many countries the women’s movement was inaugurated with 
the struggle for criminal law reform, typically on rape. Conversely, feminist legal 
critique has had a tremendous influence on criminal law, doctrinally, procedurally, 
and institutionally. Some have even claimed it “as the only academic movement of 
the 1980s that made an impact on criminal law.”1 Bold doctrinal law reform even 
in an area like rape, one of the earliest sites of feminist intervention, has however 
become enmeshed in the intractable stickiness of patriarchal social norms, which 
are hard to displace. Even so, over the few past decades the feminist project in 
domestic criminal law has morphed into a hugely successful intervention in the 
realms of international and transnational criminal law producing a set of unin-
tended consequences that feminists themselves are increasingly perturbed by. In 
this chapter, I offer an overview of the feminist project in criminal law, mapping in 
particular its rising influence while also elaborating on the stakes involved and the 
1 George Fletcher, “The Fall and Rise of Criminal Theory,” (1998) 1 Buffalo Crim. LR 279 ff.
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costs and benefits of these successes. I seek to reveal various strands of the internal 
feminist critique of such successes, which suggest that feminists need to pause and 
reassess their non-reflexive resort to the state and the criminal law as a means of 
furthering feminist goals.
Feminist legal scholarship is today an established field intervening in areas as 
diverse as tort, contract, constitutional, labor, international, criminal and even tax 
laws. Yet, the very success of feminist legal theory and activism has gone some dis-
tance toward creating a sexual division of labor of sorts in legal academia. Feminists 
might still seem to congregate in family law. Within criminal law, feminists might 
specialize in sexual offenses, occupying a feminist intellectual ghetto, as Lacey char-
acterizes it.2 Other feminists may go a bit further to study the criminal law’s reach 
over women as legal subjects involved in intimate relation3 as with battered wives 
or where they disproportionately appear as victims. Although a feminist critique of 
the law of theft is as likely as the law of sexual assault to produce significant redis-
tributive effects for women, the feminist project in criminal law bears strong path 
dependence in being intertwined around an axis of sex/gender/sexuality.
Even being tethered to the sex/gender axis of analysis, the reach of the femin-
ist project in criminal law is extensive. One only has to consider the compulsory 
first-year criminal law curriculum to get a sense of likely arenas for feminist inter-
vention. Teaching English criminal law, one can hardly fail to note early on in the 
law of causation, that the cases of Steel and Malcherek4are about women who were 
murdered because they refused the sexual advances of male defendants. Feminists 
have contributed to theorizing the duty of care in the context of omissions liability. 
Du-boid Pedain has drawn on care feminism to criticize decisions like R. v. Bland5 
and argue that viewed through the lens of “care morality,” the doctor–patient duty of 
care might well exceed the demands of the criminal law and its “stranger morality.”6 
Other feminists have interrogated the extent to which specific offenses, like homi-
cide, rape, and grievous bodily harm reflect women’s experiences. Seizing upon the 
contingency of the common law and the inability of outdated statutes to deal with 
domestic violence, for instance, English feminists have argued that a husband be 
held guilty of constructive manslaughter when his severely mentally abused wife 
commits suicide after being physically assaulted by him. They have energetically 
sought to reconfigure defenses such as provocation, diminished responsibility, and 
self-defense in the interests of female offenders. In the few instances where they 
2 Nicola Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects, Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory (1998), 99 ff.
3 Victoria Nourse, “The ‘Normal’ Success and Failures of Feminism and the Criminal Law” (2000), 
Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 13-037, 953 ff.
4 R. v. Steel and Malcherek [1981] 1 WLR 690.
5 Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] A.C. 789.
6 Antje du Boid-Pedain, “The Duty to Preserve Life and its Limits in English Criminal Law,” in 
Dennis Baker and Jeremy Horder (eds.), The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law:  The Legacy of 
Glanville Williams (2013), 296–327 ff.
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have not been solely preoccupied with defending women’s interests, feminists have 
joined forces with critical legal scholars. Thus, when critiquing the non-availability 
of the defense of consent for sadomasochistic gay men, feminists may appear to 
have endorsed liberal values, only also then to bear witness to the very limits of 
liberalism in that sadomasochistic sex embodies “an erotics of anarchy, of treason, 
and an inversion of all that the law and a liberal legal system stand for.”7
Feminist energy so far has not, however, been expended only on these turgid mat-
ters of first-year criminal law doctrine but has significantly contributed to a steady 
expansion of the remit of the criminal law, as it relates to the spheres of the family 
and the market. The feminist critique of the public–private divide within criminal 
law has led to the conceptualization of private harms such as child abuse, marital 
rape, date rape, homosexual rape, and domestic violence8 in terms of crime,9 lead-
ing to the creation of new offenses. As Jeannie Suk observes:
Over the past forty years feminists have advocated transforming the way that the home 
as a legal institution is perceived and treated, particularly by the criminal justice system. 
With the great success of this movement, the ideas that drive the reform are no longer new 
or radical to legal actors, they have laid down roots in legal doctrine, theory, and practice, 
as intellectual and ideological forces in lawmaking, adjudication, administration, and legal 
culture. They are now at home in the law.10
The popularity of the harm principle in offering the major justification for 
criminalization has assisted feminists whose list of gendered harms warrant-
ing criminalization has steadily grown. Indeed, in the Anglo-American world, 
feminist legal successes are synonymous with some form of criminal law reform. 
Feminists have been busy in many countries although their prospects for success 
vary across domestic jurisdictions. In the 1990s, Canadian feminists “witnessed, 
often with some astonishment, the development of a new and radical feminist 
inspired state discourse on ‘violence against women,’ ”11 including the official 
embrace of feminist anti-pornography discourse. In the United States and the 
United Kingdom, feminists have been successful in pushing forth legislation on 
a range of public harms against women such as sexual harassment, pornography, 
prostitution, voyeurism, rape, and stalking. Feminists have also been instrumen-
tal in re-envisioning how the criminal law relates to the market by delineating 
7 Matthew Weait and Rosemary Hunter, “Commentary on R v Brown,” in Rosemary Hunter, Clare 
McGlynn, and Erika Rackley (eds.), Feminist Judgments From Theory to Practice (2010), 245 ff.
8 Aya Gruber, “The Feminist War on Crime,” (2006–07) 92 Iowa LR 741 ff.; see fn. 57, domestic vio-
lence did not exist as a crime, Schneider terms violence by intimates as “woman abuse.”
9 Lacey (n. 2) 101 ff.
10 Jeannie Suk, At Home in the Law: How the Domestic Violence Revolution is Transforming Privacy 
(2009), 4 ff.
11 Lise Gotell, “A Critical Look at State Discourse on ‘Violence Against Women’: Some Implications 
for Feminist Politics and Women’s Citizenship,” in Manon Tremblay and Caroline Andrew (eds.), 
Women and Political Representation in Canada (1998), 39–84, 39 ff.
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the conditions under which exploitative labor conditions can be prosecuted as 
trafficking. Implicit in this are judgments about the types of labor that may qual-
ify as legitimate work.
More generally, feminist issues for criminal law reform can be characterized by 
feminist convergence (as with rape) or considerable feminist divergence as with 
pornography in the 1980s and with sex work and trafficking in recent years. The 
feminist project in criminal law also has multi-scalar reach. The province of criminal 
law itself has greatly expanded over the past few decades. International criminal law 
did not exist as a field in the 1950s12 and this dynamic area of the law is arguably still 
relatively new and untested. Transnational criminal law, meanwhile, has received 
even less attention: indeed, it is only in the past decade that it has been theorized as 
a distinct body of law, which ought to be subject to the rigorous scrutiny that any 
domestic criminal law regime undergoes.13 Interestingly, however, and perhaps as 
testimony to the transnational career of feminism, feminists have already left an 
indelible imprint on both international criminal law and transnational criminal law 
through their interventions on sexual violence in armed conflict and trafficking, 
respectively. Yet debates on criminal law in these contexts take place within the field 
of international law. This chapter is an effort to consolidate the common themes 
of feminist engagement in these arenas and to fold them back into the scholarship 
on criminal law, an endeavor that now appears urgent given the incredible reach of 
these reform efforts.
This chapter will reflect on the extensive points of contact between feminists and 
the criminal law at the domestic, international, and transnational levels. I start with 
the domestic level for feminists’ most extensive and long-standing critique of the 
criminal law. Several of the unresolved feminist debates at the domestic level have 
then been transported to the international domain. There, in specialized bureau-
cratic spaces in foreign locales and without the pressures of democratic challenges 
to the lawmaking process, feminists have achieved successes that are not always 
easy to justify. Given the transnational nature of contemporary feminism, concep-
tual innovations at the international level are then borrowed back home to influence 
domestic law. Hence, the feminist project in criminal law can only be understood 
by tracing these flows of feminist legal expertise. Further, although I focus on the 
substantive law, feminists have been hugely invested in procedural and evidentiary 
reform as well as in restructuring the criminal justice system. Indeed, where the 
thrust of feminist lawyering has been to uncover gendered harms and rename them 
as crimes, reinforcements in the form of procedural law are vital for effecting a 
change in social norms.
12 Robert Cryer, Hákan Friman, Darryl Robinson, and Elizabeth Wilmhurst, An Introduction to 
International Criminal Law and Procedure (2010).
13 Neil Boister, “Transnational Criminal Law?,” (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 
953–976 ff.
9780199673599_Hornle_Book.indb   62 10/28/2014   1:05:46 PM
feminist approaches to criminal law   63
ii. Reforming Criminal Law at Home—
Some Examples of Feminist Success
1. Rape
The offenses of rape and domestic violence exemplify feminists’ most hard-won 
successes in criminal law reform, with feminists having intensively engaged with 
rape law for very many years. Across the Anglo-American world, rape law reform 
has generally followed a certain trajectory of liberalization: although rape in many 
jurisdictions can only be committed by a male against a female, non-penile pene-
tration has now been recognized thus displacing the patriarchal investment in the 
sanctity of the womb. Again, rape may or may not be gender-neutral as to the per-
petrator, but is likely to be gender-neutral as to the victim. In addition, many juris-
dictions have abolished the marital rape immunity. Where earlier a successful rape 
conviction required some de facto proof of the exertion of force by the defendant 
and active resistance by the survivor, rape laws now require the lack of affirma-
tive consent. Consent is defined quite explicitly as in section 74 of the U.K. Sexual 
Offences Act 2003, where a consenting person agrees by choice, having both the 
freedom and capacity to make that choice. Rape shield laws are the corollary in evi-
dentiary law to these shifts in substantive law, disallowing evidence of the sur vivor’s 
past sexual history to be admitted at any stage of the trial except under certain 
restricted gateways.
In the United States, Gruber argues that American feminists’ advocacy has 
strengthened state power to punish gender-based crimes in apparent lock step 
with the U.S.  penal system. Laws that adopt prevailing views of criminality and 
victimhood, such as predator laws, enjoy great popularity. Rape continues to be 
understood in paradigmatic terms where strangers physically attack the rape victim 
rather than “nonparadigmatic” rapes where victims do not suffer physical injuries, 
or are acquainted with defendants, or are in sexual professions.14 Moreover, reforms 
that seek to counter gender norms, such as rape shield and affirmative consent laws, 
are controversial, sporadically-implemented, and empirically unsuccessful.15
Even in jurisdictions with nuanced and liberalized rape laws, rape is under-
reported, rape attrition rates are high, and victims continue to be doubly trauma-
tized by trial, prompting considerable feminist inquiry into the gap between the 
law and its implementation. Consequently, there is a burgeoning literature on “rape 
myth acceptance,” “victim precipitation beliefs,” and their contribution to the “jus-
tice gap.” “Rape myths” are descriptive or prescriptive beliefs about rape, its causes, 
14 Aya Gruber, “Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime,” (2009) 84 Washington LR 581–660, 
594–595 ff. 15 Gruber, (2009) 84 Washington LR 584 ff.
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context, consequences, perpetrators, and victims that serve to deny, downplay, or 
justify male sexual violence against women. These views held by the general pub-
lic and agents of the criminal justice system influence how individual rape allega-
tions are disposed of.16 One powerful myth is the myth of stranger rape involving 
“a sudden, surprise attack by an unknown, often armed, sexual deviant. It occurs 
in an isolated, but public, location, and the victim sustains serious physical injury, 
either as a result of the violence of the perpetrator or as a consequence of her efforts 
to resist the attack.” Few rapes share this profile, thus rendering the majority of 
rapes invisible within the criminal justice system. In their study of mock jurors’ 
deliberations, Ellison and Munro found that while jurors are not beholden to the 
stranger rape myth, they replicate strong gender stereotypes and belief in conven-
tional scripts of sex, male and female sexuality, and a seduction script based around 
male-dominated, adversarial, sexual interaction—the location where it took place, 
the consumption of alcohol, and the sexual signals exchanged. Complainants were 
treated harshly if they were intoxicated, as they ought to have been responsible 
unless the defendant spiked their drink or indulged in morally inappropriate behav-
ior. Further, Ellison and Munro found that jurors harbored numerous assumptions 
regarding the instinct to fight back, the compulsion to report the incident imme-
diately, and the inability to control one’s attendant emotions; assumptions which 
influenced jury deliberations, and ultimately their verdict outcomes. Expectations 
of force, injury, and resistance were so deeply engrained in the popular imagination 
that educating jurors seemed futile. In a similar vein, Gotell shows how affirmative 
consent standards in Canadian rape law exhibit a specific expression of neoliberal 
governmentality with an attendant discourse of risk and responsibility for defend-
ants and survivors alike.17
Strangely enough, feminists respond to the justice gap by asking for more criminal 
law that penalizes enforcement officials for refusing to file the victim’s complaint or 
the further education of judges, jurors, and enforcement officials to eliminate these 
biases. Yet some feminists have resisted this move by asking if feminists themselves 
might not be making erroneous assumptions about rape myths. In a controversial 
article in 2013,18 Reece argues that feminists in assuming to know what “normal 
sex” looks like might in fact be hindering honest conversations on rape myths by 
setting up a divide between (their) elite opinion and the uneducated rape myths of 
the public. Feminists might inhabit these moments of immense uncertainty so as to 
assess the future direction of rape law reform.
16 Louise Ellison and Vanessa E. Munro, “A Stranger in the Bushes, or an Elephant in the Room? 
Critical Reflections Upon Received Rape Myth Wisdom in the Context of a Mock Jury Study,” (2010) 
13 New Crim. LR 781–801, 782 ff.
17 Lise Gotell, “Rethinking Affirmative Consent in Canadian Sexual Assault Law: Neoliberal Sexual 
Subjects and Risky Women,” (2009) Akron LR 865–898 ff.
18 See Helen Reece, “Rape Myths: Is Elite Opinion Right and Popular Opinion Wrong?,” (2013) OJLS 
1–29 ff.
9780199673599_Hornle_Book.indb   64 10/28/2014   1:05:46 PM
feminist approaches to criminal law   65
2. Domestic violence
While rape law has become consistently refined over time, feminists have had to 
rename domestic violence as a special offense rather than pursue liability for griev-
ous bodily harm. Domestic violence reforms have gone farthest in the United States 
both due to the influence of radical feminism in U.S. legal theory and unique factors 
such as a strong victims’ rights movement. Its success has meant that its “punitive, 
retribution-driven agenda” now constitutes “the most publicly accessible face of the 
women’s movement.”19 Gruber symbolizes the main protagonist of the American 
feminist movement thus—
The zealous, well-groomed female prosecutor who throws the book at “sicko” sex offend-
ers has replaced the 1970s bra-burner as the icon of women’s empowerment. Indeed, many 
regard criminal law reform as one of feminism’s greatest successes.
According to Suk, where the state was earlier loathe to interfere with the private 
domain of the home, it is today thought to be inadequate in preventing wom-
en’s abuse from their own family members—domestic violence law has trans-
formed the home into a site of coercion and abuse; home is where the crime 
is!20 Increasingly, popular reforms in criminal court systems include “sweeping 
protection orders,” “specialized courts,” “special evidentiary rules,” mandatory 
arrests, and no-drop policies.21 Gruber has illuminated the confluence of the 
feminist movement and the conservative tough-on-crime victims’ rights move-
ment focused on retribution, pointing to the conservative origins of the framing 
of the crime of domestic violence, and feminists’ strategies, which adopted a 
problematic victimization and agency rhetoric. Although the relation between 
domestic violence advocates and law enforcement was initially tenuous, Gruber 
argues that the dilemma between the aggressive prosecution of domestic violence 
as a form of gender subordination and the attendant costs to women’s autonomy 
was eventually resolved in favor of the former. Mandatory arrest and no-drop 
policies took root all over the country. Suk claims that the criminal protection 
order, the “grandmother of domestic violence law” was crucial to the criminal-
ization of domestic violence. The criminal protection order is often a condi-
tion of pretrial arrest so that presence at home becomes a proxy for domestic 
violence. Similarly, Suk shows how violating a protection order could result in 
prosecution for the serious felony crime of burglary. By obtaining a criminal 
protection order and making its violation a crime, the state she argues pro-
duces a criminal law practice of “state-imposed de facto divorce.” Rather than 
punish violence between spouses and intimate partners, their decisions to live 
like spouses and intimate partners are increasingly being criminalized. Gruber 
19 Gruber, (2009) 84 Washington LR 582 ff. quoting Dianne Martin. 20 Suk (n. 10) 6 ff.
21 Gruber, (2006–07) 92 Iowa LR 747 ff.
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bemoans how a grassroots progressive movement transformed into an ally of 
conservative criminology where, in order to support domestic violence crimi-
nalization in the face of victim reluctance, reformers maintained the innocent 
victim/pathological offender paradigm using the very methodology that was 
instrumental in women’s oppression.22
Gruber lists numerous unintended consequences of domestic violence law 
reform, such as where domestic violence protection orders are routinely issued, 
often in ex parte situations, without the woman’s request and where women are 
arrested more frequently, including for wasting state resources by not pursuing 
prosecution, thus undermining their autonomy. Suk goes further to argue that 
state-imposed de facto divorce shifts decisional power from individual women to 
state actors like prosecutors. Current domestic violence policies can, as Gruber 
and Suk point out, also have disparate effects on racial minorities. According to 
Suk, arraignments for domestic violence in New  York county criminal courts 
by and large involve minorities living in the poorest parts of Manhattan, who 
are disproportionately prosecuted under these laws. Mandatory arrest and 
pro-prosecution policies thus reinforce systemic biases of the criminal justice 
system. Defendants’ right to a fair trial is compromised. But minority women are 
not spared either, as women at the intersection of multiple axes of subordination 
(race, immigrant status, income level) appear to suffer the most under mandatory 
policies. Whether criminalization works is inconclusive:23 of course, it sends out 
the symbolic message that domestic violence is serious but it entrenches the view 
that it is an insular rather than endemic wrong. As Suk points out, domestic vio-
lence reform has insidiously ensured criminal law control of the home alongside 
control-oriented approaches to crime in the public space—the home becomes an 
instrument for law enforcement within it but also an instrument for criminal law 
control. Individuals’ private arrangements in property and intimate relationships 
are displaced, according to Suk, and they cannot contract around the state’s man-
dates without risking punitive consequences. Domestic violence reform in the 
United States also went on to produce offshoots in tackling non-intimate violence 
against women through the introduction of the offense of stalking in the early to 
mid-1990s.
3. Battered Woman Syndrome
While feminists have vigorously lobbied for an expanded criminal law to counter 
the unique gendered harms women suffer, they have also addressed the vulner-
abilities of women like battered women who offend by killing their partners. The 
two main partial defenses to murder in English criminal law are provocation 
22 Gruber, (2006–07) 92 Iowa LR 783 ff. 23 Gruber, (2006–07) 92 Iowa LR 807, 809 ff.
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(now loss of self-control) and diminished responsibility. Provocation had its 
roots in male “restoration gallantry” and demanded a sudden loss of control and 
an almost immediate response to provocation. In the early 1990s, several cases 
involving battered women came up against this narrowly drawn test of provoca-
tion. The simmering frustrations and helplessness of battered wives and their 
lingering response meant that their vulnerable mental condition from years of 
abuse could, at best, be considered for the defense of diminished responsibility 
although Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) was not yet a recognized medical 
condition. Through the persistent activism of feminists, however, courts were 
compelled to recognize the gender bias inherent in these partial defenses to mur-
der. Feminists have followed court cases implicating the defense of provocation 
even where it involved a male defendant who killed a male friend. In the case of 
Morgan Smith,24 for instance, the crucial issue was whether the characteristics 
of the defendant could be taken into account when determining whether the 
defendant’s response to the provocation was reasonable. Although Morgan Smith 
held such characteristics to be relevant, a subsequent Privy Council decision 
in the case of Holley25 adopted a more objective standard leading to feminist 
criticism.
Ever since the early 1990s and feminists’ elaboration of the “gendered morphol-
ogy and ontology of provocation” (a term coined by Edwards), as well as the indif-
ference of English law to the social realities of women’s lives, the reform of the 
partial defenses has had to seriously consider implications for battered women who 
kill. The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 is the latest such attempt and although it 
has rendered the response leg of the loss of self-control defense more objective, it 
responds to sustained feminist critique over the years. Thus, the loss of control need 
not be sudden as long as the response is not an act of revenge. The qualifying trig-
gers now include an anger trigger and a fear trigger; the latter geared toward bat-
tered women. Some have criticized the micro-management of the defense of loss of 
self-control into which they think battered women have been shoehorned. Sexual 
infidelity meanwhile is explicitly excluded as a qualifying trigger demonstrating 
Parliament’s zero-tolerance approach toward the violent behavior of jealous men. 
Some allude to this move as signifying gesture politics but, while it is too soon 
to predict the practical effects of the 2009 law, the sexual infidelity exclusion has 
already been compromised in the case of Clinton.26 Even as the defense of loss of 
self-control was being refashioned, BWS became a recognized medical condition 
so that the defense of diminished responsibility can now be utilized by battered 
women.
24 R. v. Smith (Morgan) [2000] 3 WLR 654.
25 Attorney-General for Jersey v. Holley [2005] UKPC 23.
26 R. v. Clinton [2012] EWCA Crim. 2.
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Battered women’s use of the two partial defenses to murder has not been 
straightforward. Even as social science literature pointed to the “learned help-
lessness” that domestic violence fosters, using BWS, some activists felt, reit-
erated a disempowered image of battered women as mentally compromised 
victims. Indeed, as Suk demonstrates, the subordinated status of the battered 
woman has influenced United States criminal law doctrine. The defense further 
individualized battered women’s cases rather than focusing on collective redis-
tributive strategies. Moreover, using BWS is hardly compatible with the use of 
self-defense, which assumes women’s agency in the face of danger. Also, self-
defense can result in a complete acquittal whereas a successful partial defense 
only reduces the sentence to one for manslaughter. Hence, some feminists have 
called for rethinking self-defense devoid of its own gender biases. This has not 
happened.
4. The transnational diffusion of feminist  
ideas in criminal law
A striking aspect of the feminist project in criminal law is the astonishing simi-
larity in conceptual and institutional content across domestic jurisdictions. This 
diffusion is made possible through human rights law and practice. The violence 
against women movement in particular has made possible the international export 
and transplantation of norms and institutional machineries. This is not to sug-
gest a seamless translation of norms and bureaucracies into domestic jurisdic-
tions. As Sally Merry has shown, intermediaries and elites who inhabit spaces of 
transnational modernity at the international venues where international human 
rights documents are negotiated then perform considerable intellectual labors 
to appropriate these ideas domestically and frame them in order to achieve local 
resonance. Transmission is enabled through elite norm entrepreneurs and social 
service providers who transplant programs conceptualized elsewhere as with 
domestic violence. This international reach of human rights law has been further 
enhanced by the globalization of legal education and the legal profession. Every 
year, thousands of law school students and academics from elite Anglo-American 
law schools travel to other parts of the world to assist with law reform while local 
elites transact with them in the language of transnational modernity. Thus, the 
Verma Committee appointed days after the infamous Delhi rape and murder 
profusely thanked several U.S.- and U.K.-based feminists in its report. By then, 
a Harvard task force was set up to advise South Asian governments on violence 
against women, much to the alarm of Indian feminists. Innovative ideas like com-
mand responsibility, developed in the crucible of international and transnational 
criminal law, were sought to be incorporated into domestic rape law as demanded 
by Indian feminists.
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iii. Feminist Interventions  
in International Criminal Law
In the 1970s and 1980s, feminists working in international human rights sought to 
bring gender concerns to the center of human rights discourse. The armed conflicts 
in Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the early 1990s meanwhile resulted in large-scale geno-
cide, which then spurred the development of international criminal law through 
the creation of the ad hoc tribunals of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) to deal with genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Feminists 
were present in the development of international criminal law right from the very 
start as reports of the sexual violence that accompanied such armed conflicts came 
to light. Up until then, as Alison Cole has argued, not only were crimes of rape and 
sexual violence slipping through the cracks of international law, but there was also 
widespread denial as to their very existence. However, under both the ICTY and 
ICTR Statutes, rape was considered to be a crime against humanity. Rapes were 
prosecuted as torture and war crimes and addressed in the context of enslavement. 
In the path-breaking case of Akayesu,27 the ICTR held that genocide could be com-
mitted through acts of rape and sexual violence. Although the Akayesu decision 
was not consistently followed in subsequent cases, its definition of rape touched on 
conceptual issues that were core to domestic feminist debates on rape.
The Akayesu decision defined rape as “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, 
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive.” As I have already 
alluded to, much feminist effort has gone into expanding the definition of rape in 
domestic legal jurisdictions from requiring penile penetration by a man of a woman 
to cover instances of non-penile penetration perpetrated against both men and 
women. The reluctance of Akayesu to spell out the exact physical acts constituting 
rape was welcomed as it emphasized the violation of bodily autonomy (the effect) 
rather than the precise nature of the act, which reflected hetero-patriarchal assump-
tions of honor and shame. Also, significantly, feminists had been lobbying domestic-
ally for a consent standard in rape to obviate the need to prove physical force and 
resistance for a successful rape conviction. Yet Akayesu embodied the very gist, it 
seemed, of a feminist theory of rape as sexual subordination in that it presumed the 
lack of consent in coercive circumstances such as armed conflict or military pres-
ence of threatening forces on an ethnic basis. In other words, the decision recog-
nized the inevitability of lack of consent in conditions of armed conflict such that a 
successful conviction for rape ought not to start with the requirement to prove lack 
of consent but to presume it.
27 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Sept. 2, 1998.
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Yet, as always, feminists were divided over how international criminal law 
must define rape. These differences can be traced back to how different schools of 
feminism understand rape. The Akayesu definition was compatible with a radical 
feminist understanding of rape: this is because the early radical feminist conceptu-
alization of rape viewed patriarchal force and coercion as endemic so as to render 
consent a meaningless concept. As MacKinnon famously observed:
force and desire are not mutually exclusive under male supremacy. So long as dominance 
is eroticized, they never will be. Some women eroticize dominance and submission; it beats 
feeling forced. Sexual intercourse may be unwanted, the woman would never have initiated 
it, yet no force may be present . . . If sex is normally something men do to women, the issue is 
less whether there was force than whether consent is a meaningful consent.28
Although some scholars adopt this formulation of rape, it has failed to gain traction 
in domestic law. In the international context of armed conflict, however, this under-
standing of rape is appealing, finding support amongst those who perceive a differ-
ence between everyday rape and wartime rape. Hence, while a consent standard is 
appropriate for domestic rape, a coercion-based standard as articulated in Akayesu 
is ideal for addressing the challenges of sexual violence in wartime. Yet, there is a 
feminist camp persuaded by MacKinnonite thinking, MacKinnon included, which 
opines that there is no difference between everyday rape and wartime rape. Hence, 
the Akayesu reading of rape can be imported back into domestic law and some U.S. 
states such as California and Illinois have indeed done so. This impulse to push for-
ward the radical feminist conceptual apparatus, however, sits in deep tension with 
the strategic imperatives of feminist activism. Thus, in the process of heightening 
the significance of sexual violence in wartime, MacKinnon has argued for rape to 
be prosecuted as genocide under international criminal law.29 In arguing for the 
recognition of genocidal rape, however, MacKinnon has had to distinguish it from 
just rape in war or everyday rape; she theorizes it as being coterminous with every-
day discrimination such that sex inequality itself becomes genocide and we are left 
wanting to punish gynocide! Also, in calling for the prosecution of genocidal rape, 
she ends up privileging ethnic differences and therefore rape by wartime victors 
rather than rape on all sides of an armed conflict.
An opposing feminist view wanted to acknowledge rape on all sides of a war 
as equally serious. Some feminists were also uncomfortable with the unintended 
consequences of a broad Akayesu-type reading of rape. For one, the elimination of 
a defense of consent could undermine the defendant’s right to fair trial. Feminists 
like Karen Engle, Annelise Lottmann, and Janet Halley also disagreed with the posi-
tion that treats rape as “a fate worse than death” as not only misinterpreting certain 
28 Catharine A.  MacKinnon, “Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State:  Toward Feminist 
Jurisprudence,” (1983) 8 Signs 650 ff.
29 Catherine MacKinnon, “Rape, Genocide, and Women’s Human Rights,” (1994) 17 Harvard 
Women’s Law Journal 5.
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cultural attitudes toward sex and honor but also intensifying for women the shame 
and loss of honor that rape implies, thus valorizing the value of rape as a weapon 
of war. For these feminists, the mainstream view also suggests a hierarchy of harms 
wherein sexual violence is worse than other forms of violence, including even the 
killings of these women’s male relatives. Indeed, a heightened view of rape as the 
worst violation meant that women who “chose” to be raped under force of circum-
stance by an enemy offering them a means of sustenance over death from starvation 
risked being labeled traitors.30 Demonstrating the seriousness of wartime rape also 
brings with it a severely compromised view of female sexual agency in relation to 
the enemy. A strictly gendered view of sexual violence additionally renders invisible 
women’s role in perpetrating sexual violence. Further, focusing on genocidal rape 
reinforces essentialist notions of ethnic difference, which can stand at complete 
odds with the social history of a conflict-ridden region where inter-ethnic sexual 
alliances were widespread. This supports nationalist narratives of conflict. As Engle 
argues, such a reading is also sexist—assuming that children of raped Bosnian 
Muslim women are automatically Serbs places a premium on Serbian sperm instead 
of their being born of a Bosnian Muslim woman’s womb.
The momentum that feminists experienced in lobbying the ICTY and ICTR 
found fruition in the negotiations leading to the 1998 Rome Statute, which came 
into force in 2002 and established the International Criminal Court (ICC). Some 
feminists have welcomed the fact that the Rome Statute went further than the ad 
hoc tribunals by referring not only to rape but also to sexual slavery, enforced pros-
titution, female trafficking, forced pregnancy, and enforced sterilization as war 
crimes and crimes against humanity under the ICC and for finding that persecution 
for purposes of crimes against humanity can be committed on the basis of gender 
discrimination. The Rome Statute has a raft of procedural protections for victims 
of sexual violence in armed conflict. Yet Halley has been critical of feminist efforts 
to move sexual crimes up the hierarchy of crimes under international humanitar-
ian and criminal law, to particularize and indeed exceptionalize them in feminist 
terms, to concentrate specific prosecutions exclusively on charges involving sex-
ual violence and maximizing the evidentiary requirements for proof of rape by 
eliminating or modifying the defense of consent.31 Halley demonstrates how these 
moves were only intensified leading up to the Rome Statute negotiations. Feminists 
formed a consensus around an updated radical feminism, which she calls femin-
ist universalism and which channeled a law reform project specifically to include 
rape in the Rome Statute, as well as sexual slavery, forced pregnancy and steril-
ization, and sexual violence. Enslavement was expanded to include trafficking in 
persons, and honor and dignity were de-linked from these crimes. However, forced 
30 Halley, (2008) 9 Melbourne Journal of International Law 105 ff.
31 Janet Halley, “Rape in Berlin: Reconsidering the Criminalisation of Rape in the International Law 
of Armed Conflict,” (2008) 9 Melbourne Journal of International Law 83 ff.
9780199673599_Hornle_Book.indb   71 10/28/2014   1:05:46 PM
72   prabha kotiswaran
maternity, forced abortion, forced marriage, forced nudity, sexual molestation, and 
sexual humiliation did not make it into the Rome Statute. Although feminist efforts 
evolved from a focus on rape to sexual violence to sexual slavery and culminated 
in the demand for crimes against gender violence (covering men in the position of 
the social woman), the crime of gender violence was not included in the Statute.32 
Nor did feminist attempts to deploy international humanitarian and criminal law 
to hold states accountable for everyday rape during peacetime succeed. Thus, the 
feminist project in international criminal law has been predominantly in a winning 
position despite losses relating to feminists’ most expansive classificatory ambi-
tions. Feminists have managed to shape the course of international criminal law in 
its early stages of development and can be relatively more assured of their influence 
internationally given that it encapsulates the core of international law values and is 
already binding on nation-states.
iv. Feminist Interventions  
in Transnational Criminal Law
Scholars of international criminal law often distinguish between international law 
in the strict sense, encompassing core crimes and transnational criminal law, which 
deals with crimes of international concern or treaty crimes. Whereas international 
criminal law consists of crimes, firmly established in customary international law 
and providing for individual penal responsibility for violations of international 
law before an international penal tribunal, transnational criminal law deals with 
the indirect suppression by international law through domestic penal law of crim-
inal activities that have actual or potential transboundary effects. States in the lat-
ter instance sign on to suppression conventions that obligate states to enact and 
enforce municipal offenses. In an article in 2003, Neil Boister called for theorizing 
the separate field of transnational criminal law as distinct from international crim-
inal law because, although it is in his view “the most significant existing mechanism 
for the globalization of substantive criminal norms,”33 it has not been subject to 
the level of theoretical scrutiny as have domestic criminal laws. Boister argues that 
transnational criminal law exhibits a democratic deficit in its formulation, lacks 
doctrinal coherence and a general grammar of criminal and penal policy amongst 
32 Janet Halley, “Rape at Rome: Feminist Inventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence 
in Positive International Criminal Law,” (2009) 30 Melbourne Journal of International Law 7 ff.
33 Boister, (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 956 ff.
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different countries, has little human rights protection, and has weak enforcement 
measures. Even as Boister was naming the field of transnational criminal law into 
being, feminists had already successfully participated in the negotiation of a major 
piece of transnational criminal law; namely, the 2000 United Nations Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking Against Persons, Especially Women and 
Children (the UN Protocol)34 supplementing the 2000 United Nations Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime.35 Feminist efforts on the transnational 
issue of trafficking were not new, however; they had earlier engaged with a similar 
suppression treaty; namely, the 1949 UN Convention for the Suppression of the 
Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others and the 1921 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children 
adopted by the League of Nations. None of these treaties have, however, enjoyed the 
popularity of the UN Protocol. The 1949 Convention, for instance, had 25 signator-
ies whereas the UN Protocol has had more than 150 signatories in the first ten years 
of its adoption.
This section investigates the context in which feminists enjoyed phenomenal suc-
cess in negotiating the UN Protocol and asks if the enforcement of the UN Protocol 
has furthered the rights of women and other vulnerable populations. American 
legal scholar Janie Chuang has detailed how differences amongst American femin-
ists on how to conceptualize prostitution and sex work resulted in the ideological 
capture of the negotiating positions occupied by both states and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) over the UN Protocol. These debates are animated, in par-
ticular, by the two oppositional camps of abolitionists or radical feminists, on the 
one hand, and sex work advocates, on the other. For abolitionist feminists, prostitu-
tion is the most extreme and crystallized form of all sexual exploitation, in turn the 
foundation of women’s subordination and discrimination. For sex work advocates, 
sex work is a plausible livelihood option for women who, despite enormous struc-
tural constraints, exercise some agency. Trafficking is defined in Art. 3 of the UN 
Protocol and can be disaggregated in terms of the mode of recruitment (recruit-
ment, transportation, transfer, etc.), the means by which it is obtained (threat or use 
of force or other forms of coercion, etc.), and the purpose for which it is obtained; 
namely, exploitation. In the case of people aged 18 and over, all three elements must 
be proved for a trafficking conviction.
The concept of consent was central to the UN Protocol negotiations, and was 
extraordinarily influenced by domestic Anglo-American feminist debates on sex 
work. The radical feminist, abolitionist camp wanted prostitution listed as an end 
purpose for which recruitment or transportation would automatically amount to 
34 G.A. Res. 25, Annex II, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 60, U.N. Doc. A/45/49, Vol. I (2001).
35 Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 53/111, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., 85th plen. Mtg., U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/53/111 (1998).
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trafficking even if it was with the woman’s consent. In other words, they demanded 
that the purpose for which the means are used should result in a finding of traf-
ficking, irrespective of the woman’s consent. The liberal lobby meanwhile wanted 
to retain the possibility of migrant voluntary sex work by decoupling the means 
of recruitment from the end purpose. The resultant compromise achieved this 
decoupling with the caveat that where certain listed means—which were broadly 
phrased—were employed, trafficking had occurred as consent was irrelevant. In 
other words, where the levels of coercion as identified by the Protocol were used, 
consent was deemed absent. When it came to negotiations of the purpose element, 
namely, exploitation, prostitution was once again ambiguously listed as “exploitation 
of the prostitution of others.” Yet the preparatory notes to the Protocol clarified that 
this inclusion did not compromise states’ domestic legal treatment of prostitution.
In the aftermath of the UN Protocol’s adoption, both feminist camps claimed 
victory for their influence over the definition of trafficking. Within five years of 
the adoption of the UN Protocol, however, non-governmental actors such as the 
Bangkok-based Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women (GAATW) conducted 
a multi-country survey to conclude that the “anti-trafficking framework has 
done little good for the trafficked person and great harm to migrants and women 
in the sex industry.”36 In a nutshell, despite the expansive Protocol definition of 
both the means and purpose of trafficking, in reality enforcement measures have 
been drastically confined to rescuing women who have been forced into sex work 
by fraud, coercion, or deceit. Specifically, despite the efforts of non-abolitionist 
NGOs at the UN Protocol negotiations to decouple trafficking from sex work 
and prostitution, and thus shake off the legacy of the 1949 UN Convention, they 
were unsuccessful. Not only was trafficking comprehended by states in terms 
of trafficking for sex work but it was also conflated with sex work itself. The sex 
sector has remained the primary focus of most countries’ anti-trafficking efforts. 
16% of the 155 countries surveyed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) in 2009 had passed anti-trafficking laws that were limited to 
sexual exploitation or covered only women and children. In the United States 
itself, it was not until 2009 that the State Department emphasized forced labor 
in its annual trafficking report. Without doubt, this emphasis on trafficking into 
sex work has not meant better human rights protection for sex workers; if any-
thing, assistance is typically conditional on assisting prosecutorial efforts. Some 
countries in fact revised their prostitution laws to decriminalize only “victim” 
sex workers, not “voluntary” sex workers. Many of these anti-sex work initia-
tives worldwide received support from the erstwhile Bush Administration and 
its coalition with conservative Christian groups as well as through the extra-
territorial operation of a U.S. domestic law, namely, the Victims of Trafficking 
36 GAATW, Collateral Damage The Impact of Anti-Trafficking Measures on Human Rights Around 
the World (2007), 17 ff.
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and Violence Protection Act, 2000 and its practice of classifying states in terms 
of their anti-trafficking initiatives through the annual Trafficking in Persons 
Reports.
The exceptionalist treatment of sex work in early anti-trafficking law meant that 
trafficking into labor sectors other than sex work, often referred to as “labor traffick-
ing” received less attention than it was due. Anti-trafficking law was also effectively 
used against refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants, especially undocumented ones. 
Experts claim that the very passage of the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime was motivated by sovereignty and security concerns rather than 
the human rights of migrant and trafficked groups. With border control at the heart 
of the UN Protocol, both countries of origin and transit were effectively conscripted 
as low-cost agents of first world states of destination to control migration result-
ing in significant damage to human rights. The heavily gendered discourse of traf-
ficking also disincentivized female migrants from traveling for work. As countries 
sign, ratify, and conform their domestic laws to the UN Protocol, the implementa-
tion of anti-trafficking law has tended to be both over-inclusive in targeting women 
engaged in voluntary sex work and under-inclusive in not addressing trafficking 
into non-sex work sectors.
Two trends characterize the current phase of anti-trafficking law. First, states 
are increasingly inclined not to conflate trafficking with trafficking for sex work 
or sex work itself, adopting instead at least at a doctrinal level domestically, a 
broader Art. 3 definition of trafficking. This does not imply an equal allocation 
of resources to prosecute trafficking for sex work and into other labor sectors; it 
does, however, mean that as states continue to legislate domestic anti-trafficking 
law and make related institutional arrangements, intra-feminist contestations that 
plagued the UN Protocol negotiations will be re-staged at a domestic level. The 
second trend revolves around attempts to resolve the continued conceptual ambi-
guity surrounding the core definitional terms of Art. 3. In the absence of clarity 
around concepts such as “abuse of position of vulnerability” and “exploitation,” the 
scope of the UN Protocol remains unclear. The UNODC has commissioned issue 
papers on these core concepts, admitting its lack of data on the magnitude of the 
problem of trafficking and states’ uneven compliance with Protocol obligations. 
Significantly, where the International Labour Organization (ILO) had previously 
stood on the borderline of the trafficking debates having assumed a controversial 
position in 1998 on the “sex sector,” the ILO is now conceptualizing trafficking as 
a form of forced labor thereby consolidating decades of efforts to eradicate forced 
labour. The ILO’s increased visibility on trafficking and its proposed standard 
setting to supplement the Forced Labour Convention of 1930 offers feminists a 
renewed opportunity to rethink the unintended consequences of the preoccupa-
tion of anti-trafficking law with sex work and the implications of using a more 
nuanced and less carceral form of anti-trafficking law to protect a larger constitu-
ency of both trafficked men and women.
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v. The Feminist Will  
to Power—Governance Feminism  
in Criminal Law
1. Governance feminism elaborated
Even the brief survey so far demonstrates the considerable success of feminist pro-
jects in domestic, international, and transnational criminal law. Whether at the 
domestic or international levels, feminists have gone from being marginal social 
movement actors, literally “outsiders” who had an oppositional consciousness 
toward state power to becoming forceful advocates for increased domestic criminal 
law who then also occupied a central and often vanguard role in the development of 
emerging fields of criminal law at the international level. Indeed, it is this feminist 
influence in the varied arenas of criminal law that drew some of us to chronicle fem-
inists’ achievements as governance feminism (GF). Halley defines GF as follows:
GF is, I think, an underrecognized but important fact of governance more generally in the 
early twenty-first century. I  mean the term to refer to the incremental but by now quite 
noticeable installation of feminists and feminist ideas in actual legal-institutional power. 
It takes many forms, and some parts of feminism participate more effectively than others; 
some are not players at all. Feminists by no means have won everything they want—far from 
it—but neither are they helpless outsiders. Rather, as feminist legal activism comes of age, it 
accedes to a newly mature engagement with power.37
GF successes in criminal law typically deploy a radical feminist view of violence 
against women overshadowing competing feminist narratives. If we were to think 
of radical feminism in terms of Catharine MacKinnon’s early writings, the state 
was viewed as patriarchal and incapable of addressing sexual subordination, the 
root cause of women’s inequality. How such a sophisticated feminist theory has 
today morphed into a decidedly liberal project calling for criminal law interven-
tion by a neoliberal penal state, often supported by religious conservative groups, 
is befuddling to say the least. Numerous factors seem to be at play in this famil-
iar “input/output” problem for feminists. In terms of the “input,” whether on rape, 
domestic violence, trafficking, stalking, or voyeurism, the radical feminist impulse 
to theorize sexual coercion as pervasive in light of its theory of sexual subordin-
ation leads feminists to reach for the sharpest legal instrument available, namely, 
criminal law, necessitating the intervention of the state. Bernstein characterizes this 
37 Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir, and Chantal Thomas, “From the International 
to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four 
Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism,” (2006) 29 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender  
335 ff., 340.
9780199673599_Hornle_Book.indb   76 10/28/2014   1:05:46 PM
feminist approaches to criminal law   77
vocal feminist insistence on criminalization as carceral feminism.38 The ascend-
ance of carceral feminism also concerns dynamics within the women’s movement. 
Especially on issues of considerable feminist divergence like sex work and traf-
ficking where a radical feminist point of view faces an equally structuralist but sex 
positive position, consensus-building results in a middle-ground liberal feminist 
view.39 Consensus is achieved at the cost of discursive complexity. Interestingly, a 
middle-ground position is not incompatible with increased criminalization because 
the very platform for consensus is the need to tackle the worst forms of coercion, 
violence, and exploitation.
Once the state is implicated, the “output” is mediated by numerous factors, 
including the emergence of an international violence against women movement, 
shifts in the agenda of the American Christian Right, the rightward drift of certain 
feminist camps, and the crisis of the modern welfare state coupled with the emer-
gence of a neoliberal sexual agenda. States have surprisingly been eager to embrace 
carceral projects much to the surprise of feminists. As Doezema notes, of all the 
issues raised over the past two decades by feminists, trafficking in women is the 
one on which even governments hostile to feminist arguments have been willing 
to “jump into bed” with feminists.40 States could not, however, be bothered with 
the niceties of feminist theorizing and are often content with the most simplistic 
notion of gender inequality, resulting in paternalist and protectionist policies, all 
while paying lip service to women’s rights and securing legitimacy. The next sec-
tion deals with the repetitive quality of enforcement patterns once these hard-won 
victories have been achieved.
2. Repeat patterns in criminal law reform
With the law of rape, despite a structural understanding of coercion and the shift 
to a consent standard, reforms have played out to produce a thin notion of consent. 
As Nourse notes, resistance has resurfaced to resolve the normative ambivalence of 
force and consent so that if the victim physically resists, courts and juries feel certain 
that she did not consent since physical force was used to accomplish sex. A deeper 
understanding of coercion itself is lost. Munro confirms this pattern in the British 
context. The centrality of overt coercion is reasserted in distinguishing acceptable 
from unacceptable forms of sexual aggression, thereby identifying, “deserving” vic-
tims who have experienced “real” harm. Further, as Gruber has pointed out, some 
38 Elizabeth Bernstein, “Militarized Humanitarianism Meets Carceral Feminism: The Politics of Sex, 
Rights, and Freedom in Contemporary Anti-Trafficking Campaigns,” (2010) 36 Signs 45–71 ff.
39 See Prabha Kotiswaran, Dangerous Sex, Invisible Labor: Sex Work and the Law in India (2011) for 
a discussion, particularly ch. 2.
40 Jo Doezema, Sex Slaves and Discourse Masters: The Construction of Trafficking (2010), 172 ff.
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feminists’ own adoption of a prosecutorial attitude, which largely conceives of rape 
(and crime in general) as a product of individual criminality rather than social 
inequality, means that the criminal law decontextualizes rape from the wider issue 
of gender inequality. As state institutions adopt the most simplistic version of the 
feminist critique, the liberal view of violence against women prevails over a rad-
ical feminist view of coercion as pervasive. The malleability of legal concepts like 
coercion, consent, and exploitation can also be seen in relation to sex work and traf-
ficking. Narrow interpretations of coercion in the context of trafficking support the 
state’s border control project, thus introducing a high threshold for trafficked status. 
Similarly, a broad understanding of exploitation renders any form of sex work for 
purposes of the trafficking offense as exploitative per se. Interpretations of these 
different concepts can produce over-inclusive and over-protectionist outcomes in 
individual cases where complex dynamics, both structural and interpersonal, are 
at play.41
Feminists’ emphasis on coercion and their use of the trope of victimhood for 
achieving law reform have often produced another significant casualty, namely, 
women’s agency. Both rape and domestic violence reforms essentialize women so 
that victims are portrayed as “paralyzed by fear, weak-willed, and even automa-
ton-like.”42 Such feminist portrayals of women are amply evident in the sex work 
and trafficking debates. Radical feminists’ focus on eradicating questionable (if 
not all) sex as if it were a virus, argues Gruber, denies women sources of pleasure 
while the overcriminalization of sexual “coercion” has led to repressive chastity 
norms and morality policing.43 Ironically, then, in her view feminist reformers 
have utilized the very mechanism of female objectification (presumably also a 
target of reform) in its effort to advocate for domestic violence criminalization 
rather than offering a more complicated account of the constrained agency of 
women. Conceptual difficulties and interpretive possibilities are in turn com-
pounded by institutional biases producing a yawning gap between hard-won 
feminist doctrinal victories and their impact on the ground. At several points in 
the criminal justice system, these reforms are watered down through the actions 
of enforcement personnel such as the police and prosecutors or even the disposi-
tions of jurors.
The criminal law can also generate remarkably perverse results. Literally 
every feminist success in criminal law is able and does inflict further harm on 
the very women that the law was created to benefit, often on the basis of patri-
archal norms of sexual morality. Rape law is littered with judgments as to the vic-
tims’ character. Gruber notes how prevailing gender norms restrict rape reform’s 
41 Vanessa Munro, “An Unholy Trinity? Non-Consent, Coercion and Exploitation in Contemporary 
Legal Responses to Sexual Violence in England and Wales,” (2010) 63 Current Legal Problems 58 ff.
42 Aya Gruber, “A ‘Neo-Feminist’ Assessment of Rape and Domestic Violence Law Reform,” (2012) 
15 Journal of Gender, Race & Justice 601 ff. 43 Gruber, (2009) 84 Washington LR 612.
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expressive value so that rape shield laws are justified on the basis of protecting 
the right to privacy rather than rendering past sexual history irrelevant to con-
sent. In domestic violence, battered women can be prosecuted for failing to sup-
port the state’s prosecution efforts against her male partner. An anti-sex work 
law that seeks to exonerate sex workers from prosecution might well be limited 
only to innocent sex workers tricked into sex work rather than women selling sex 
under severe force of circumstance. This has led feminists to ruminate over the 
law’s deception. For Munro, despite the progressive feel of policy rhetoric, the 
law when implemented reinserts hierarchies of victimhood, distracts from cru-
cial questions about agency, constraint, and construction, and serves to insulate 
the law from internal critique. Surveying reforms in the areas of rape, domestic 
violence, and the law of self-defense, Nourse notes how reform perpetuates the 
notion of progress while reiterating old norms, which are in turn “resurrected 
in empty spaces, deliberate ambiguities, and new rhetorics.”44 She states that this 
is to be expected when law reform is won at the cost of deliberative ambiguity, 
which eventually generates high costs. Ambiguity hides discarded or unlikely 
norms, making it difficult to know precisely what the norm is, which produces 
the illusion of reform thus forestalling further reforms whereas the insidious 
effects of the old norms persist. This generates hypocrisy at the very least, if not 
perversity.
3. A feminist legal realist view of criminal law
The case for feminists to rethink the use of the criminal law is compelling. Politically, 
we might revive self-help strategies characteristic of second-wave feminist move-
ments. Legally, rape law reformers might turn to, say, tort law. Feminists, however, 
are too deeply implicated in criminal law reform to entertain these possibilities seri-
ously. Indeed, whether at the domestic or international level, feminists have often 
started out lobbying for a specific offense like rape but then escalated their demand 
for criminalizing all-encompassing behavior such as sexual violence and gender 
violence. One way to minimize feminist disappointment (which otherwise trans-
lates into demands for more criminal law) would be to entertain a nuanced legal 
realist understanding of the criminal law, one which is not preoccupied with an 
enforcement gap between law in the books and law in action. Duncan Kennedy’s 
idea of the tolerated residuum is illuminating here. Writing in the context of rape 
laws, Kennedy has proposed that the legal system will always tolerate a certain level 
of sexual abuse, which he terms as the tolerated residuum of abuse. This residuum 
depends on contestable social decisions about what abuse is and how important it 
is to prevent it. This in turn affects practices of abuse and social practices of both 
44 Nourse (n. 3) 952 ff. quoting Siegel.
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men and women, irrespective of whether they themselves are abusers or victims.45 
This realist view of the criminal law not only expands feminists’ vision as to the dis-
tributive consequences of rule changes on a range of stakeholders but also tempers 
demands for increased state intervention, whose potential for producing perverse 
results is well known.
The need to rethink criminal law is particularly striking when we consider its 
counterintuitive effects on markets such as sex work. States can legislate diametric-
ally opposing policy reforms on sex work ranging from increased criminaliza-
tion (the United States and Sweden) to legalization (the Netherlands) but end 
up with similar effects on sex industries. This may be because in these domestic 
contexts, the unstated enforcement prerogative is different from the official law 
on the books or because there are huge institutional inefficiencies in translating 
policy into action. Such similarities in outcomes have caused some non-lawyer 
feminists to consider the law as irrelevant, while others have attributed these out-
comes to regulatory dynamics in post-industrial economies and to the interaction 
between the criminal law and modes of governmentality. I have meanwhile shown 
that where the market is the target of criminal law intervention, a more nuanced 
account of the interaction between the criminal law, civil law, market practices, 
and informal social norms is indispensable. In the anti-trafficking debates for 
instance, a key question remains whether labor law is not more suitable than the 
criminal law.
vi. Conclusion—Coming Back Full 
Circle or the Way Forward?
Back in 1989, launching the feminist legal project in law, Carol Smart expressed 
skepticism about the criminal law given its “juridogenic” nature. She warned against 
being seduced by it, and in particular against MacKinnon’s totalizing theory of gen-
der subordination that led her to criminal law reform. Not long after that, Lacey 
critiqued MacKinnnon and Dworkin’s view on pornography for “representing fem-
inism as a political doctrine which is conservative, authoritarian and unconcerned 
with free expression”46 while being too optimistic about state politics; a strategically 
uncertain path. Lacey’s predicament remains with us:
45 Duncan Kennedy, Sexy Dressing etc.: Essays on the Power and Politics of Cultural Identity (1993), 
137 ff. 46 Lacey (n. 2) 94–95 ff.
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It is a serious and recurrent question whether any specific post-liberal vision can remain 
intact once one has entered into liberal legal reform. The subsequent processes of interpre-
tation and enforcement involve the imposition of liberal categories and arguments which 
inevitably distort analysis of the situation or phenomenon which is to be ameliorated.47
More than 25 years after Smart’s initial provocation, we have come full circle. Whereas 
in the 1980s feminists struggled to get states to understand the core message of femin-
ism, today it has become common sense even for states. Rather than the criminal 
justice system adopting a feminist agenda, as Gruber claims, feminist reformers have 
adopted the criminal justice system’s agenda! In this chapter, I have charted feminist 
contributions to the building out of an expanding architecture of criminal law at the 
domestic, international, and transnational legal levels, which has traveled far and wide 
through the human rights machinery. Feminist “success” has however come at a steep 
cost, including for women’s rights. If, as Nourse claims, reform is typically a “marbled” 
affair and the rich veins of new law cut across the “plain vanilla” of settled, conven-
tional belief, it is little surprise that the promises of criminal law remain illusory for 
feminists. Feminism’s own image might be a casualty where, as Gruber reminds us, 
opposition to the criminal law remains the hallmark of progressive movements.
Looking forward, how should feminists relate to the criminal law? Gruber proposes 
outright disengagement as the lonely voice of women’s empowerment will not be heard 
above the sound and fury of the U.S. criminal system’s othering discourse. A return to 
the streets is the only way out. Alternatively, she looks to policy efforts that trans-
form economic distributions and cultural attitudes. After all, the opportunity costs 
of pursuing criminal law reforms are substantial in that they ignore the distributive 
functions of both public and private law, which undergird the system of sexual sub-
ordination. Another alternative might be to continue mapping the disparate effects of 
the criminal law in relation to the institutions of the market and family and for varied 
constituencies therein. This may mean introspecting over-cherished feminist beliefs as 
recent research on rape myths in the United Kingdom suggests. Feminists cannot also 
be oblivious to unexpected political opportunities: although deeply tragic, the brutal 
Delhi gang rape and murder of a young woman mobilized millions of Indian men and 
women alike in a way that the Indian women’s movement has failed to do. Although a 
critical analysis of the resultant rape law reforms is sobering given the increased role 
for the Indian state, the incident seems to have shifted, even if minimally, the state’s 
tolerated residuum of abuse. Feminists in such circumstances have no choice but to 
engage with the state and may have to do so in a constrained manner. The challenge 
is to use the expanded policy opportunities around “violence against women” while 
resisting the individualizing, retributive thrust of governmental agendas.48
47 Lacey (n. 2) 94 ff.
48 Lise Gotell, “The Discursive Disappearance of Sexualized Violence:  Feminist Law Reform, 
Judicial Resistance and Neoliberal Sexual Citizenship,” in Dorothy E.  Chunn, Susan B.  Boyd, and 
Hester Lessard (eds.), Feminism, Law and Social Change: (Re)action and Resistance (2007), 130 ff.
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In conclusion, feminists today are at a unique juncture. The cautions of an earl-
ier generation of feminists against embracing state power have been thrown to the 
wind as feminists have increasingly gained a foothold in the governance of sex and 
gender through the criminal law. Feminists’ attachment to the gendered construc-
tion of harm and a commitment to representing females notwithstanding, our crit-
ical impulses entail wielding power sensibly, including speaking out for the interests 
of men when needed. The recent Indian rape law reforms, for instance, criminalize 
trafficking but not forced labor, a condition under which many Indian men strug-
gle. Feminists may even consider abandoning the “intellectual ghetto” of gender- 
and sex-based crimes to, say, critiquing core preoccupations of criminal law theory 
or its relation to the political economy of crime. Untethering feminist scholarship 
from an exclusive preoccupation with women, gender, sex, and harm could well 
further the feminist critique of criminal law rather than the feminist project in 
criminal law.
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